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*J. Crim. L. 434 In April 2017, it was alleged that the respondent (L) joined a chat room called "Say
Hi' via WhatsApp and made arrangements to meet a girl he believed to have been 14. The girl in
question was actually an adult male, Mr U, who ran a vigilante group called "Predator Hunters ' whose
aim was to find and expose adults seeking to have sex with children.
L's profile in the group, which was a platform where sexual encounters could be easily arranged, had
suggested "me and my female partner wanting a girl that's willing to try a new experience' indicating
that the girl should be aged 18 to 29. Mr U joined the chat under the guise of a girl named "Bexie'.
The registration stated the girl was born in 1999, suggesting that she was 18, however, when Bexie
approached L in the chat she stated: "Hiya am just your average 14-year-old girl looking to meet new
friends '. L responded by giving his age as 22 years and that his partner was a 19-year-old female
before asking Bexie if she was looking for sex and if she wanted a threesome. Bexie responded by
saying "Hey am 14 so I'm very inexperienced '. Discussion continued around arrangements and
Bexie's experience where Bexie stated that she was a virgin. L then requested a picture of Bexie
which was sent. It was argued later in the trial that this picture was of someone older than 14 and
therefore misleading in regards to her age. When L asked Bexie to send him a nude photograph,
Bexie said "I don't send them sorry but if I come to you then I'll let you take some. Shall I come
tomorrow after school? '. Bexie then asked "Does my age not bother you ' to which L responded "no '.
When asked if he had done it with a girl Bexie's age, the respondent stated "no '. Further discussion
took place regarding the arrangements and contraception. When the specified time arrived for the
sexual encounter, Mr U, members from "Predator Hunters' and the police turned up at L's door and he
was arrested.
L was indicted in the Crown Court for a single offence of attempting to meet a child following sexual
grooming contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 but applied for a stay of proceedings
on the basis of an abuse of process due to entrapment. At the end of the prosecution's case, the stay
was accepted the jury were discharged. The prosecution sought leave to appeal against this ruling
pursuant to s. 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
Held, allowing the appeal, that Mr U did not induce L into committing an offence. It was observed
that L made all of the running and at no time did Mr U take a lead. Mr U did no more than provide L
with an opportunity to offend and as such, the requirements for entrapment were not satisfied. There
was also an absence of state misconduct and as such the judge erred in staying the proceedings and
a new trial was ordered.
Commentary
The role of entrapment is to prevent an abuse of process by the state and to ensure that the accused
is afforded a fair trial. As such, this has been shaped by art. 6 of the ECHR as well as statutes such
as s. 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which allows the court to refuse to admit
evidence which has been obtained in circumstances which would have an adverse effect on the
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fairness of proceedings. *J. Crim. L. 435 The law on entrapment has been developed through the
common law with the leading case being R v Looseley [2001] UKHL 53, [2001] 1 WLR 2060 where it
was determined that in such cases, a stay on proceedings could be granted on the grounds of
entrapment (following the cases of R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, Ex p Bennett [1994] 1 AC
42 and R v Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104). Lord Hoffman stated that entrapment " … occurs when an agent
of the state--usually a law enforcement officer or a controlled informer--causes someone to commit an
offence in order that he should be prosecuted' (at [2071]).
This definition seems problematic when considering the facts of the present case as TL concerned
the actions of a non-state agent in the form of "Predator Hunters'. This raises questions as to whether
a non-state actor can be capable of bringing about entrapment and if so, what level of behaviour is
required to achieve this.
At trial, the judge considered Looseley and concluded that:
There is nothing to stop such a group from gathering material and handing it to the police. It may form
the basis of an intelligence led police operation, it may add to the body of evidence obtained by the
police. However, in my judgment, if the purpose of the exercise is to behave like an internet police
force, and to behave in a proactive way, in order to obtain evidence in which to mount a prosecution,
it seems to me that the common law principle against entrapment should apply to this private citizens'
operation as it would apply to a police operation.
In reaching this line of reasoning, the trial judge relied upon the authorities of R v Shannon [2001] 1
WLR 1, CRHCP v The General Medical Council and Saluja [2006] EWCA 2784 (admin) (herein
referred to as Saluja) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence from Shannon
v United Kingdom (admissibility) (67537/01) [2005] Crim LR 133. In Saluja, a journalist posing as a
patient persuaded a doctor, on payment, to provide her with a fraudulent doctor's note so that she
could take time off work and have a holiday. Mr Justice Goldring held that:
… the authorities leave open the possibility of a successful application for a stay on the basis of
entrapment by non-state agents. The reason I take to be this: Given sufficiently gross misconduct by
the non-state agent, it would be an abuse of the court's process (and a breach of article 6) for the
state to seek to rely on the resulting evidence. In other words, so serious would be the conduct of the
non-state agent have to be that reliance upon it would compromise the court's integrity. (at [81])
In making this finding, Goldring J suggested that this level of conduct would be rare and the actions of
the journalist in this case fell far short of such circumstances. In Shannon, the agent provocateur was
an undercover journalist posing as an Arab sheikh in relation to the supply of drugs. The Court of
Appeal rejected the appellant's argument that there had been an abuse of process on the basis that
there was a distinction between state actors and private citizens. Potter LJ suggesting "there was no
suggestion of criticism of the part played by the police or Crown Prosecution Service, the organs of
the state responsible for gathering the evidence and instituting proceedings' (at [21]). His Lordship
concluding that in relation to staying proceedings in entrapment cases:
… it is not itself sufficient, unless the behaviour of the police (or someone acting on behalf of or in
league with the police) and/or the prosecution authority has been such as to justify a stay on grounds
of abuse or process. (at [39])
A subsequent appeal brought to the ECtHR in Shannon v United Kingdom was dismissed, but the
ECtHR did acknowledge that it could not exclude the possibility that evidence obtained as a result of
entrapment by a private individual may render proceedings unfair.
In considering this line of analysis, the Lord Chief Justice, in the present case, acknowledged that
"there is a recognition that the conduct of a private citizen may in theory found a stay of proceedings
as an abuse of process' (at [32]). His Lordship adding that "it is not inconceivable that given
sufficiently *J. Crim. L. 436 gross misconduct by a private citizen it would be an abuse of the court's
process (and a breach of article 6) for the state to seek to rely on the product of that misconduct' (at
[32]). But the Lord Chief Justice highlighted that this level of conduct is rare and that there had been
"no reported case in which such activity has founded a successful application for a stay …' (at [32])
and that the "circumstances of the present case are not amongst them' (at [33]). In criticising the trial
judge, the Lord Chief Justice concluded that:
[His] approach allowed no distinction between the conduct of U, as a private citizen, and agents of the
state, when considering whether to stay the prosecution as an abuse of process. In our judgment he
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erred in that respect. For that reason, the judge's conclusion cannot be supported. (at [31])
Hofmeyr "The problem of private entrapment ' [2006] Crim LR 319 argues that the case law on private
entrapment is both "contradictory and unsatisfactory' in its nature (at [319]) and it is difficult to
disagree with this position. In his judgment, it seems that his Lordship could have done more to clarify
the role of non-state actors in relation to entrapment. It seems fair to conclude that although the
behaviour of a non-state actor would not directly bring about an abuse of process, the reliance by
state authorities of evidence obtained by a non-state actor whose behaviour is considered "sufficiently
gross misconduct' would be deemed enough for a stay of proceedings. It is therefore apparent that
the crucial consideration in both "private ' and "non-private ' entrapment cases is the type of behaviour
necessary to bring about an abuse of process.
In Looseley, Lord Nicholls stated that "it is simply not acceptable the state through its agents should
lure its citizens into committing acts forbidden by the law and then to seek to prosecute them for doing
so' (at [2063-4]). He added that "[t]he difficulty lies in identifying conduct which is caught by such
imprecise words as "lure" or "incite" or "entice" or "instigate"' (at [2064]). The Lord Chief Justice in
reflecting on this identified a distinction between on one hand causing and on the other hand
providing an opportunity to commit an offence with importance being placed on whether "the law
enforcement officer behaved like an ordinary member of the public'. (at [20])
The House of Lords, in Looseley, placed emphasis on the nature of suspicion when considering
entrapment, with Lord Hoffman surmising that "[t]he only proper purpose of police participation is to
obtain evidence of criminal acts which they suspect someone is about to commit or in which he is
already engaged. It is not to tempt people to commit crimes in order to expose their bad characters
and punish them' (at [2077]). His Lordship looked at the need for reasonable suspicion and proper
supervision but clarified that "reasonable suspicion does not necessarily mean that there must have
been suspicion of the particular person who happens to have committed the offence'. Lord Hoffman
acknowledged that "a bona fide investigation into suspected criminality [may] provide and opportunity
for the commission of an offence which is taken by someone to whom no suspicion previously
attached' (at [2078]). His Lordship relied upon the example in Williams v DPP (1993) 98 Cr App R 209
where, during an investigation into a series of vehicle thefts in Essex, the police left an unattended
transit van with the back doors open and cartons of cigarettes visible. In his analysis he stated:
If the trick had been the individual enterprise of a policeman in an area where such crime was not
suspected to be prevalent, it would have been an abuse of state power. It was justified because it was
an authorised investigation into actual crime and the fact that the defendants may not have previously
been suspected or even thought of offending was their hard luck. (at [2079])
In applying these principles from Looseley, the Lord Chief Justice recognised that Mr U had
committed no offences in his investigation. It was accepted that there may have been confusion
brought about by the date of birth on the profile of Bexie, but in the communications it was made
explicitly clear that Bexie was 14. Mr U provided information about Bexie, including age and sexual
experience but at no stage did he induce L to commit the offence. His Lordship adding that it was the
user of L's phone who made all the running. He added:
*J. Crim. L. 437 … Mr U appears to have been scrupulous to avoid encouraging his interlocutor in
the proposed sexual activity and at no time did he take the lead. This is far removed from a case of
incitement in the sense of one person pushing another towards committing an offence which he would
otherwise not commit, for example by badgering someone to engage in unlawful sexual or other
activity. (at [34])
His Lordship determined that the deciding factor on whether the actions of this private individual could
amount to a stay of proceedings was to ask whether the same conduct, if carried out by the police
would do so. He conceded that this would be difficult to determine as a non-state actor would not be
subject to the same codes of conduct or oversight as the police. Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ suggested
that if carried out by the police, Mr U's conduct would have been:
… an example of the type of investigation of potentially serious criminal activity where he absence of
suspicion of an individual, but intelligence to suggest that a dating site was being used for criminal
purposes, would provide a proper basis for targeting that site …. If officers had engaged in broadly
similar conduct an application to stay the proceedings as abuse of process would have failed. (at
[36-37])
What supported Mr U's conduct was not only that he was able to abstain from crossing the line
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between providing an opportunity to offend and actively inducing the behaviour of L, but that his
choice of site was not random and was based on intelligence that it was being used for the purpose of
procuring children for sexual encounters. In applying both the tests of the behaviour and reasonable
suspicion, Mr U had, in the eyes of the appeal court, done nothing to suggest that his "conduct was so
egregious that the integrity of the court would be compromised by allowing the prosecution to
succeed' (at [38]).
The court were keen to point out that they were dealing with the question before them in relation to
the conduct of L as a potential entrapment and not acting as a tribunal as to whether his actions were
to be encouraged. During the original trial, the respondent argued that by using evidence obtained by
vigilante groups that they were encouraging their activity. It was argued that vigilante groups ought
not to be encouraged by the police, prosecution and ultimately the courts. In response, his Lordship
warned that he did not seek to undermine the position that private individuals should refrain from
seeking to identify and capture those who groom children for sexual purposes. He stated that the
police's "own investigations might be compromised, that private investigations may not produce
admissible evidence, that there may be risks to the safety of their investigators and the subjects of
their investigations and the zeal of some "vigilantes" may lead them to seriously improper conduct'
([at 39]). His Lordship strongly suggested that Mr U would have been better to have passed his
suspicions immediately to the police, allowing them to investigate them in his place.
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